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At the end of the school year, law schools across the country hold
competitions for positions on law journals, and the University of
Pennsylvania Law School is no different. Though colloquially known
as the "writing competition," Penn Law's competition requires stu-
dents primarily to rewrite footnotes and citations from an apocryphal
law review article to conform to the dictates of The Bluebook.1 This may
make sense, as the University of Pennsylvania Law Review is one of the
four entities (with the Columbia Law Review, the Harvard Law Review,
and The Yale Law Journal) that compile The Bluebook, but it is clear
that even those schools that have nothing to do with the creation of
the "Uniform System of Citation" often rely heavily on the fascinating and
frustrating intricacies of The Bluebook's legal citation rules when testing
students for placement on the editorial staffs of their legal journals 2
t B.A. 1989, University of California, Los Angeles; M.A. 1992, University of South-
ern California; Ph.D. 1997, University of Southern California; J.D. Candidate 2003,
University of Pennsylvania. Even the most rococo of constructions could not appro-
priately reflect the extravagance of gratitude due Professor David A. Skeel for his aca-
demic grace in the seminar that inspired this Comment, and his remarkable support
outside of it. Thanks also belong to Professor Catherine T. Struve for her intellectual
elegance and contagious enthusiasm. No note would be complete without obeisance
to four whose profound effect on my academic development cannot be overstated:
Professors Joseph A. Boone,James R. Kincaid, NancyJ. Vickers, and the late Richard S.
Ide.
, THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOK]. References to editions other
than the most recent will be designated by edition number.
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For many, this selection process is their first exposure to an anxiety
over citation and authority. The familiarity bred by that prolonged
and intense exposure makes The Bluebook (and its attendant anxiety) a
part of their history and mythology, a foundational text upon which
legal culture is built.
Of course, this is no surprise. It is axiomatic that the air that ed-
dies around lawjournal offices and the other spaces of legal academia
is permeated with The Bluebook. Indeed, student editors of law jour-
nals spend an extraordinary amount of time yanking the articles and
essays of legal academics into compliance with the dictates of The Blue-
book. While it is true that some law schools and many courts do not
follow The Bluebook's rules exclusively, 4 The Bluebook is still firmly en-
trenched in its "authoritative position,"5 particularly in the academic
world." Because it is a structuring text that is inescapable even in its
Chief, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, to the Board of Officers of the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review (Apr. 11, 2002) (on file with author) (outlining the selec-
tion criteria for participation on the law reviews of Boalt, Columbia, Duke, New York
University, Northwestern, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia,
and Yale).
See Stephen R. Heifetz, Blue in the Face: The Bluebook, the Bar Exam, and the
Paradox of Legal Culture, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 695, 702-06 (1999) (noting that "[f]or over
seventy years, law students have begun their journeys into the legal profession with The
Bluebook in hand," and that it is an "important building block[] that [has] contributed
to [an] important culture[]").
4 See Melissa H. Weresh, TheALWD Citation Manual: A Coup de Grace, 23 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 775, 780 (2001) ("Many law review staffs have published either
supplements or alternatives to the Bluebook [sic]. . . . [Miany jurisdictions have
adopted specific citation rules for practice within that jurisdiction." (citations omit-
ted)); see also A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-Unformn System of Citation: Surviving with the
New Bluebook (Including Compendia of State and Federal Court Rules Concerning Citation
Form), 26 STETSON L. REV. 53, 167-217 (1996) (collecting citation rules from state and
federal courts). The American Association of Law Libraries's 1995 report on citation
formats stated:
The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation was expected to be used by counsel
and/orjudges in 33 jurisdictions.
Other sources of authority used were style manuals of particular states,
which were expected to be used by counsel and/or judges in 15 jurisdictions;
style sheets or memoranda, which were required in 5 jurisdictions; and court
rules or statutes, which were expected to be followed in 15 jurisdictions. Only
six jurisdictions had no expectation of use of any citation authority by either
counsel orjudges.
AALL Task Force on Citation Formats Report March 1, 1995, 87 LAw LIBR. J. 582, 590
(1995) [hereinafter Task Force] (citations omitted).
Weresh, supra note 4, at 781.
See Task Force, supra note 4, at 590 ("The Bluebook [sic] is the overwhelming
source of authority for legal citation form in academe. Virtually all academic law re-
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absence, a rather impressive literature has blossomed around it, com-8 . 9
prising book reviews,7 diatribes,8 satires, and defenses of alternate sys-
tems of citation. 3 As a text, The Bluebook has been called "[t] he hyper-
trophy of law,"'" likened to The Bible,'2 Pilgrim's Progress," and a
complicated statute. 4 As a process, its development has been implic-
itly compared to the development of the common 
law.' 5
Most articles about The Bluebook treat it as an artifact, as an object
to be evaluated. It is mocked, or critiqued, or dismissed. On occa-
sion, however, scholars have looked behind The Bluebook, to examine
accepted rules of legal citation that are codified in it. For example, in
Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting Our
Signals Uncrossed, Ira P. Robbins investigates the use of a particular
signal-"cf. "-and the ways in which legal doctrine has turned on the
interpretation of the implications of the signal itself.'6 A few articles
have investigated the legal citational footnote as a phenomenon,
views currently published require citation form to follow The Bluebook." (citation omit-
ted)).
7 E.g., Warren D. Rees, The Bluebook in the New Millennium-Same Old Story?, 93
LAW LIBR.J. 335 (2001) (evaluating the Seventeenth Edition); Dickerson, supra note 4
(analyzing the Sixteenth Edition and suggesting improvements for the Seventeenth
Edition); James W. Paulsen, An Uninformed System of Citation, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1780
(1992) (reviewing the Fifteenth Edition).
8 E.g., Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to The Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343 (1986)
(criticizing The Bluebook and serving as a preface to the first (and only) edition of The
University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation, known as the Maroonbook); see also infra
note 27 (discussing the Maroonbook and how its rules differ from The Bluebook's rules).
9 E.g., William R. Slomanson, Bluebook Review: A Uniform System of Citation, 28
ARIZ. L. REv. 47 (1986) (reviewing A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 14th ed. 1986)).
"3 Eg., Posner, supra note 8 (preferring the Maroonbook to The Bluebook); Weresh,
supra note 4 (praising the ALWD Citation Manual, newly published by the Association
of Legal Writing Directors).
Posner, supra note 8, at 1343.
12 Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Uniform System of Citation, 43 BROOK. L. REv. 826,
826 (1977).
I. Jim C. Chen, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue:
The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, 15th ed., 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1527, 1527
(1991).
14 Id. at 1528.
15 See Posner, supra note 8, at 1344 ("[A] large structure is built up, all uncon-
sciously, by accretion .. ").
16 Ira P. Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting
Our Signals Uncrossed, 48 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1045-47 (1999). Robbins demonstrates that
the holding in Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 529 (1997), regarding the retroactive
application of criminal procedure, relied in part on the notion that a "cf." citation im-
plies weak support, or support by "dictum or by analogy" that does not control the re-
sult. Robbins, supra, at 1046.
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• 17commenting on its overuse and overextension. These critiques and
these analyses come from legal academia, most often from legal jour-
nals, and each of these approaches takes as its ground the idea that
the rules of The Bluebook, though perhaps flawed and sometimes inef-
ficient, are on the whole the sorts of rules by which citation should be
governed. Thus, the conventional analysis tends to look at specific
rules in The Bluebook and discusses their applications, their weaknesses,
or their advisability. It is less common to probe and prod these rules
for what they can reveal about the institution of legal citation itself. In
such a project, The Bluebook becomes not so much an artifact as a code,
in the semiotic sense-a system of signs that does not reflect "objective
reality," but, rather, constructs a political and social grammar.
As a semiotic code, The Bluebook effectively hides ideological roots
and assumptions behind a mask of necessity and naturalness. Conse-
quently, a kind of skepticism is a foundational tenet of this Comment,
which attempts, through textual analysis of The Bluebook, to reveal as-
sumptions naturalized by the conventions of legal citation. It is not
my project to suggest that these assumptions and their consequences
should be exterminated or exchanged for others. s Rather, they can
17 See Arthur Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1009, 1011 (1990) [hereinafter Austin, Skulduggery] ("Authors have recognized that
discerning, intelligent-or unethical-manipulation of footnotes can be a significant
factor in achieving promotion, tenure, and status."); Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as
Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1131, 1135 (1987) [hereinafter Austin, Product
Differentiation] ("Footnoting has evolved from primitive origins and use as a 'pure' ref-
erence into an artistic and abstruse discipline that functions as a subtle, but critical,
influence in the determination of promotion, tenure, and professional status." (cita-
tions omitted)); Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 647
(1985) (calling footnotes in judicial opinions "an abomination"); Carol Sanger, Edit-
ing, 82 GEO. LJ. 513, 521 (1993) ("There is also the bizarre convention of law review
footnoting, a growth industry we should not indulge."); Aside, Don't Cry OverFilled Milk:
The Neglected Footnote Three to Carolene Products, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1555 (1988)
(describing "footnote three's contribution to the development of citation overkill in
American law and the impending triumph of form over vulgar functionalism"); Injus-
tice Breyer's Opinion, A Footnote Has No Place, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at B18 (explain-
ing why Justice Breyer does not employ footnotes in his opinions). But see Bryan A.
Garner, Unclutter the Text by Footnoting Citations, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 87, 87 (suggesting
that textual citations help mask logical incoherence in legal writing); William Glaber-
son, Legal Citations on Trial in Innovation v. Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, at Al
(noting that some who follow the movement, led by Bryan A. Garner, to move citation
sentences in legal briefs and judicial opinions to footnotes "are making the switch to
democratize the law because the public is put off by strings of numbers that can make
legal Prose seem even more impenetrable than it is").
It should be noted that I write neither to praise The Bluebook nor to bury it; and
though sometimes critical of the text, this Comment, far from eschewing The Bluebook's
rules, cites according to its tenets.
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be examined for the insight that they give to legal culture and the
construction of legal thought in the United States. Indeed, I suggest
that the "anxieties" identified below might be a function of a legal sys-
tem based in precedent and slow, deliberate accretion of legal rules. 19
Specifically, I will examine the institution of the "string cite"-a ci-
tation sentence or clause comprising more than one signal and/or
more than one authority within a signal-recognized in rule 1 of The
Bluebook.20 Three subdivisions of this rule codify three of The Bluebook's
fundamental precepts: rule 1.2, which sets up and defines introduc-
tory signals for legal citation; rule 1.3, which prescribes the order of
signals within a single footnote; and rule 1.4, which establishes a hier-
archy of authorities within each signal. Ostensibly formulated to
communicate efficiently and clearly the "weight" of the authorities
cited, and modeled on a hierarchical system in which the "strongest"
go first, the rules governing the string cite serve to uncover a tension
within legal scholarship: what I call (after Harold Bloom's "anxiety of
influence")21 the "anxiety of authority."
In a Note in The Yale Law Journal, Kenji Yoshino effectively glossed
Bloom's anxiety of influence:
The theory claims that all poets (writers) grapple with the anxiety that
everything they write is influenced by their powerful predecessors. In
19 The use of the word "anxiety," itself, to describe the phenomenon suggests its
necessity to the system described. Slavoj 7i~ek (glossing Jacques Lacan) explains:
[A] nxiety occurs not when the object-cause of desire is lacking; it is not the
lack of the object that gives rise to anxiety, but, on the contrary, the danger of
our getting too close to the object and thus losing the lack itself. Anxiety is
brought on by the disappearance of desire.
SLAVOJ ZI2EK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES LAcAN THROUGH
POPULAR CULTURE 8 (1991). Put in different terms, the object-cause of desire (which
is, by definition, impossible for the subject to achieve) is represented as the goal of the
drive. "[T]he real purpose of the drive is not its goal (full satisfaction) but its aim: the
drive's ultimate aim is simply to reproduce itself as drive, to return to its circular path,
to continue its path to and from the goal." Id. at 5. To come "too close" to the goal is
to realize the "lack of the lack" that produces anxiety. Thus, the object (inhering in
The Bluebook) of a seamless and perfectly precise codification of standards of "author-
ity" creates as a necessary by-product an anxiety about the very concepts of authority
the codification seeks to ossify.
20 See THE BLUEBOOK R. 1, at 21 ("Citation sentences and clauses may contain
more than one signal. Signals are ordered according to rule 1.3. Individual citations
following each signal are ordered according to rule 1.4.").
21 For a general discussion of Bloom's "anxiety of influence," see HAROLD BLOOM,
THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973); HAROLD BLOOM,
KABALLAH AND CRITICISM (1975); HAROLD BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975);
HAROLD BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION: REVISIONISM FROM BLAKE TO STEVENS
(1976).
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order to become great, Bloom asserts, poets must break free of this in-
fluence by conducting "strong misreadings" of their predecessors-that
is, by subverting the meanin 2of their predecessors' texts in order to
make their own contributions.
The anxiety of authority seems, at first blush, to be the polar opposite
of the anxiety of influence, for it requires not that the predecessors'
influence(s) be shaken, but rather that the predecessors' work be
shown to support and therefore authorize, on some level, the succes-
sor's text. However, Bloom's model necessitates that the successor
situate herself in relation (even if only in counterrelation) to the
predecessors' text(s), thus creating, or at least reinforcing, a tradition
or genealogy. And this, too, is the project of the scholar who cites.
The citing scholar embraces the comfort of authority, and authority
therefore takes on added importance in her work. Spurred on by
conventions of citation (such as those found in The Bluebook), author-
ity becomes a source and a marker of anxiety. This anxiety ultimately
reflects a confusion over what constitutes "authority" and "support"
for a legal proposition, and inflames a debate within legal academia
about the proper sphere and meaning of "expertise." Thus, this
Comment identifies three specific anxieties attendant on the conven-
tions of legal citation: the anxiety of authorities, the anxiety of rele-
vance, and the anxiety of authoritativeness.
In tracing these anxieties, first this Comment will briefly rehearse
the history of The Bluebook, focusing on certain challenges and
changes as a way to identify some primary concerns of the debates
over citation. The bulk of the remainder discusses rules 1.2, 1.3, and
1.4 of The Bluebook, as well as practices of legal citation not explicitly
codified in the text, as a way to elucidate the aforementioned tensions
within the legal academic community.
I. THE BLUEBOOKAND AUTHORITY
The development of The Bluebook from its inception in 1926 as a
twenty-six-page pamphlet for use at Harvard Law School to its current
status as a 389-page manual used at the vast majority of law schools in
the country has been amply documented. 3 Even so, there are some
22 Kenji Yoshino, Note, What's Past is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 104
YALE L.J. 471, 473 (1994).
23 See, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A SIXTY-FIVE YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (1998) (containing
text from all editions of The Bluebook); Dickerson, supra note 4, at 57-66 (discussing The
Bluebook's history, spanning over seventy years); Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1782-85 (de-
scribing the evolution of The Bluebook).
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occurrences in this history that deserve mention here. In 1949, the
national conference of law review editors supported The Bluebook's
adoption as a national system of citation, 4 and in 1976, The Bluebook's
marketing strategy, theretofore focused on the academic world, ex-
panded to include practitioners and the courts. 2' The Fifteenth Edi-
tion, published in 1991, required for the first time that citations to
books, articles, and student works include the author's full name; did
away with most parallel citations to official state reporters; and revised
the order of authorities within each signal (rule 1.4) so that constitu-
26tions and statutes preceded cases. The first major challenge to the
supremacy of The Bluebook came from The University of Chicago in
1989, with the publication of The University of Chicago Manual of Legal
Citation, known as the "Maroonook."" A further competitor has come
onto the scene more recently with the publication of the ALWD Cita-
tion Manual. Interestingly, it has been suggested that a widely ma-
24 Paulsen, supra note 7, at 1783.
25 Id. at 1784.
26 LouisJ. Sirico,Jr., Fiddling with Footnotes, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1273, 1276-77 (1992)
(reviewing THE BLUEBOOK (15th ed.)). These changes survived into the Seventeenth
Edition, as opposed to some changes of the Sixteenth Edition. See infra note 35 and
text accompanying note 29 (outlining differences between the editions).
27 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MANUAL OF LEGAL CITATION (The Univ. of Chi.
Law Review & The Univ. of Chi. Legal Forum eds., 1989) [hereinafter MAROONBOOK];
see also Posner, supra note 8 (containing a scathing commentary on The Bluebook and
praising the Maroonbook). Posner's article in The University of Chicago Law Review in-
cluded the Maroonbook as an appendix. Id. at 1353-68.
The Maroonbook vastly simplifies The Bluebook's rules. Its first and only edition,
from 1989, has only sixty-three pages, inclusive of its index. Rule 3, which corresponds
to The Bluebook's rule 1, occupies only a page and a half (to the Seventeenth Edition's
nine-and-a-half pages). Rule 3.1 does not identify specific introductory signals, but al-
lows an authority to be introduced without introduction, in the case of direct support,
or by "an ordinary English phrase explaining its force and or purpose."
MAROONBOOK, supra, R. 3.1, at 12. The rule for the order of authorities, which in The
Bluebook is spread over rules 1.3 (order of signals) and 1.4 (order of authorities within
each signal), allows authorities to "be organized in any manner that seems desirable."
Id. R. 3.3, at 12. It continues:
The most important authorities, or those most supportive of the argument be-
ing made in text, should usually appear first. Authority that supports the text
only by analogy, or indirectly, should appear next, in a separate citation sen-
tence introduced by language explaining how the authority supports the
proposition made in text. Sources that provide only tangential support for
the proposition in text should be omitted.
Id.
28 ASs'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & DARBY DICKERSON, ALWD CITATION MANUAL:
A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION (2000) [hereinafter ALWD MANUAL].
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ligned change in The Bluebook inspired the creation of this latest man-
ual.
In 1996, the Sixteenth Edition appeared, including within it mo-
mentous changes. A. Darby Dickerson, who was to become a prime
mover behind, as well as an author of, the ALWD Citation Manual, ex-
plained these changes in measured language that eluded many com-
mentators:
The editors substantially revised rule 1.2 on introductory signals. As
they noted in the Preface, "The number of signals has been reduced and
the distinction between signals has been simplified." Specifically, the
"contra" signal and arguably the "e.g.," signal, have been deleted. The
definitions for [no signal], "see," "accord," and "but see' have been altered.
The primary fallout from these changes probably will be that the num-
ber of "[no signal]" cites will decrease and the number of "see." cites will
increase, because "see' must now be used to show that the cited authority
29"directly states or clearly supports" the proposition.
Because "[a]uthors use signals to indicate the purpose for which an
authority is cited and the weight with which an authority supports or
contradicts a particular proposition[,] [c]hanging what the signals
mean effectively changes the substance of our common law.,30 This
change prompted an impressive outcry, as well as an impressive back-
lash, and the Association of American Law Schools passed a resolution
formally opposing the changes and calling for authors, editors, and
practitioners to disregard them." The resolution specifically pointed
out the "weaknesses" of the process of editing The Bluebook.3 2 The
widespread unrest over the Sixteenth Edition encouraged the ALWD
to publish an alternative citation manual, "prepared by members of
the legal writing community"
33 in 2000.3 4
29 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 66 (quoting THE BLUEBOOK (16th ed.)) (footnotes
omitted).
30 Id. at 69 (footnotes omitted).
Carol M. Bast & Susan Harrell, Has The Bluebook Met Its Match? The ALWD
Citation Manual, 92 LAW LIBR.J. 337, 34142 (2000); see Weresh, supra note 4, at 784
(noting that the "signals change [was] the impetus for the resolution").
Association of American Law Schools, Resolution Concerning Promulgation of
Rules of Citation I Uan. 4, 1997) (on file with author).
33 Weresh, supra note 4, at 786.
The ALWD Citation Manual lists, in rules 45.2 and 45.3, the signals and their
uses. The contours of the lack of a signal are exactly coterminous with the Seven-
teenth Edition's definition. CompareALWD MANUAL, supra note 28, R. 45.2(a), at 301
("Do not use a signal if: (1) The cited authority directly supports the stated proposi-
tion[;] (2) The cited authority identifies the source of a quotation[; or] (3) The cited
authority merely identifies the authority referred to in the text."), with THE
BLUEBOOOK R. 1.2(a), at 22 (stating that no signal should be used when the "cited
(Vol. 151: 245
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The seventeenth edition of The Bluebook reinstates the signals of
the fifteenth edition with minor changes. 5
II. LEGAL CITATION AND THE ANXIETY OF AUTHORITY
Stepping back from the specific controversies of The Bluebook's ci-
tation rules, it is perhaps valuable at this point to review some major
purposes of citation. Judge Posner has identified four purposes for
having a system of citation:
The first is to spare the writer or editor from having to think about cita-
tion form .... The second purpose, which is self-evident, is to econo-
mize on space and the reader's time. The third, which is in tension with
the second, is to provide information to the reader. The fourth is to
minimize distraction. 6
The American Association of Law Libraries Task Force on Citation
Formats recognizes a longer list of principles of legal citation form,
including uniqueness, brevity, eliminating redundancy, informative-
ness, reducing dissimilarity among forms, similarity to original, logic,
permanence, readability/transcribability, tradition, standardization,
simplicity of system, honesty, precision, public domain, longevity, and
universality.37 Both Judge Posner and the Task Force note that The
Bluebook's system of citation is not in compliance with many of these
principles.3 8  It is clear, however, that these are largely principles of
authority (i) directly states the proposition, (ii) identifies the source of a quotation, or
(iii) identifies an authority referred to in the text"). Rule 45.3 lists the same signals as
The Bluebook's rule 1.2(a)-(d), in the same order, except that "accord' and "see also" have
been excised. The rule for ordering authorities within each signal evinces a complex-
ity similar to The Bluebook's, however there is less attention to international and inter-
governmental materials. CompareALWD MANUAL, supra note 28, R. 46.4(a)-(c), at 308-
10 (containing as its only international or intergovernmental category, "[t]reaties and
international agreements"), with THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.4(a)-(i), at 25-27 (including a
category of primary materials called "[r] esolutions, decisions, and regulations of inter-
governmental organizations").
35 The Seventeenth Edition's definition for "[no signal]" begins, "Cited authority
(i) directly states the proposition," while the Fifteenth Edition uses the word "clearly"
in place of "directly." Also, appended to the Seventeenth Edition's definitions for "see
also," "cf.," "compare... [and]... with... [and] ... ," "but cf," and "see generally" is a sen-
tence urging the use of an explanatory parenthetical with each of these signals. See,
e.g., THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(b), at 23 ("Parenthetical explanations ... following each
authority are.., strongly recommended.").
36 Posner, supra note 8, at 1344.
37 Task Force, supra note 4, at 588-89.
38 See Posner, supra note 8, at 1344-49 (arguing that The Bluebook's intricacy contra-
venes these purposes); Task Force, supra note 4, at 589 ("[lt is clear that the current
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the systematization of citation, and not principles of the institution of ci-
tation.
At its most basic, citation is a structure of indebtedness. Its pur-
pose is simple attribution of ideas and expressions of ideas to author-
ity outside of a specific text. This extraordinarily facile observation
serves to re-emphasize that the quarrels over The Bluebook focus on the
system and not the institution itself. This discussion begins at this ba-
sic level, with the suggestion that an analysis of the cover page of my
"primary" text-The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (Seven-
teenth Edition)-can reveal a number of these assumptions about ci-
tation per se: (1) that citation to outside authority is necessary or at
least advisable; (2) that there should be rules for this citation; (3) that
these rules should be organized into a system, which implies a "logical"
ordering; (4) that the system should strive for coherence and uni-
formity; (5) that the system should be laid out in one place, under
one title; (6) that the system, though uniform, will change; and (7)
that the system might have taken, and might still take, other forms.
The comments by Judge Posner and the Task Force, and by most
other commentators, concern assumption two and beyond, but leave
the first-that citation is necessary or at least advisable-unaddressed.
It may seem difficult to question this most basic assumption effec-
tively. The notion that citation to authority is necessary seems almost
inescapable in a legal system based on precedent. If "[r]easoning
from precedent, the core of legal training [in the United States],
shares with Burkean conservatism the assumption that what has been
done before should be done again, "4 then it might seem to follow in-
exorably that the precedents reasoned from (and therefore outlining
what should be done again) must be cited. It is possible, however, to
imagine a tradition that does not find it necessary to make so brutally
obvious the specific texts and authors that influenced or, in some
cases, dictated the result of a case or inquiry. That such a system
system of legal citation, as reflected by the Bluebook [sic), conflicts with many, if not
most, of these principles, and notjust in the area of case citation.").
39 Many (including myself) have quibbled with the necessity of making a distinc-
tion between "primary" and "secondary" texts or authorities, although The Bluebook im-
plicitly endorses such a distinction in rule 1.4(i) by heading the category of sources
"secondary materials." Paradoxically, The Bluebook, designated here as my "primary"
text, is a "secondary material" under rule 1.4. Moreover, I might further argue that my
real "primary" text is conventional legal citation, and The Bluebook, as a text that illus-
trates it, is somehow "secondary."
40 Heifetz, supra note 3, at 695-96.
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might be inefficient does not mean that it is impossible or even im-
probable.
Approaching the problem from this perspective, The Bluebook be-
gins to signify more than its contents. We can take the very existence
of The Bluebook (as a codification of the current system of legal cita-
tion) and its endorsement of a particular citation practice as a reflec-
tion that citation to authority is important. Indeed, citation to author-
ity is so important that The Bluebook clearly contemplates that a single
proposition will be supported by citation to more than one authority.
Such a citation is commonly known as a "string cite," and is governed
by The Bluebook's rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. While judicial opinions fully
exploit these three rules on occasion, the string cite receives its most
complete expression in the work of legal academics, in the pages of
legal journals. Much of the remaining discussion will focus on such
texts.
A. The Authority of Taxonomy
Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 of The Bluebook are the scaffolding upon
which the string cite hangs. As suggested above, rule 1.2, defining
and implicitly ranking introductory signals, has been the subject of
the most recent controversy. Rule 1.3 seems innocuous, simply mak-
ing explicit that the order in which the signals appear in the preced-
ing rule is the order in which they should appear in a citation sen-
tence using multiple signals, and providing that the families of signals
should appear in different citation sentences. Rule 1.4 identifies and
ranks the authorities within each signal. Thus, these three rules func-
tion in tandem, sketching interlocking hierarchies.
Reviewers and commentators regularly bemoan the intricacies of
The Bluebook, noting their peculiarity to the legal profession.4 ' These
interlocking hierarchies are a significant source of its idiosyncratic
complexity. Rule 1.2, for instance, which governs the "weight" that an
authority throws behind the proposition it supports, includes in its
taxonomy eleven discrete signals,42 and suggests that the yoking of sig-
41 See Bast & Harrell, supra note 31, at 339 ("The citation systems of other disci-
plines are far less complex."); see also infra text accompanying note 54 ("None of the
citation guides used extensively in the Humanities, for example, includes a provision
for distinguishing among the weights of authorities cited.").
42 Note that these signals include the absence of a signal as first among the eleven
enumerated: [no signal], e.g., accord, see, see also, cf, compare ... [and] ... with...
[and].... contra, but see, but cf, and see generally. THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2, at 22-24.
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nals may create even more.43 Though labeled "arcane and incompre-
hensible"44 by at least one commentator, this taxonomy strives to indi-
cate with precision the particular manner in which cited authority
lends its support. The assumptions inherent in this hierarchy are that
an authority that does not directly support a statement should none-
theless be cited, and that it is necessary and proper to distinguish pre-
cisely among techniques by which an authority provides its support.
And that is the apparent purpose of this classification system.
In his Preface to The Order of Things, Michel Foucault addresses the
problem of classification, asking: "When we establish a considered
classification, when we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other
less than two greyhounds do .... what is the ground on which we are
able to establish the validity of this classification with complete cer-
tainty?"4 5 Implicit in this question is the presumption that classifica-
tions are established with certainty. And that makes perfect sense, for
a classification would lack utility if the class it identified were not cer-
tain-that is, if class "A" were not clearly delineated from and (there-
fore?) defined against some other group that was "not-A." In order
for a taxonomy to have meaning, its boundaries must be clear and
certain. That almost goes without saying.
Confrontation with an "incredible" taxonomy, however, exposes
the uncertainty of all classification. Foucault's collision is with a pas-
sage in Borges quoting from a Chinese encyclopedia dividing animals
into fourteen categories: "(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) em-
balmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray
dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innu-
merable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m)
havingjust broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look
like flies."46  The collision with this improbable taxonomy demon-
strates the limitation of our own system of thought ("the stark impos-
sibility of thinking that") .4' These unnatural, uncertain classifications
call into question our own naturalized distinctions. Moreover, "[t]he
central category of animals 'included in the present classification'...
43 See id. at 22 ("'E.g.' may also be used in combination with other signals, pre-
ceded by a comma: See, e.g., But see, e.g ..... ).
Thomas R. Haggard, Basic Citation Form, Part III, S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at
13,13.
45 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES, at xix (Vintage Books 1994) (1970).




is indication enough that we shall never succeed in defining a stable
relation of contained to container between each of these categories
and that which includes them all."48 This insight translates to the very
concept of Order: "Order is, at one and the same time, that which is
given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines
the way they confront one another, and also that which has no exis-
tence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a lan-
guage. 48  Order, expressed in taxonomic categories, presupposes its
own existence: We cannot begin to order the disordered without be-
lieving that Order is always already present, as much as we imagine
that our taxonomies simply uncover logical, primordial rules of Or-
der. We use taxonomy as a comfort, or, better, as a fetish, allowing us
to believe in categorical certainty/discreteness/precision even in the
knowledge of its absence.5 o This paradox undergirds legal citation.
B. Rule 1.2 and the Anxiety of Authorities
The argument above helps to denaturalize/defamiliarize" the
taxonomy of signals, the primary placement of which (it is in the first
rule in The Bluebook) would serve to ground it, to naturalize it as that
48 Id. at xvii.
49 Id. at xx.
50 See ZIEK, supra note 19, at 34-35 (discussing the "famous disavowal" je sais bien,
mais quand mime-I know very well, but all the same-that is constitutive of the fetish);
Lee Edelman, Seeing Things: Representation, the Scene of Surveillance, and the Spectacle of
Gay Mae Sex, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 93, 107 (Diana Fuss
ed., 1991) ("[T]he problem engaged in the fetish is that of affirming a belief in pres-
ence over and against the knowledge of loss. ). As Freud notes, fetishism can be
determined "by the occurrence of an early deterrence from sexual activity owing to
fear, which may divert the subject from a normal sexual aim and encourage him to
seek a substitute for it." SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY
20 n.1 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Basic Books 1962) (1925) (emphasis added). For
example, "the foot represents a woman's penis, the absence of which is deeply felt." Id.
at 21 n.2 (emphasis added). For a clearer discussion of the fetish, see 17 SIGMUND
FREUD, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 7 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Hogarth Press
1955) (1925).
51 The concept of "defamiliarization" comes originally from Victor Shklovsky, for
whom it was constitutive of poetic language-literary technique, that is, was a process
of making strange the familiar. See Victor Shklovsky, Art as Technique, in MODERN
CRITICISM AND THEORY: A READER 15, 27 (David Lodge ed., 1988) (calling "material
obviously created to remove the automatism of perception" the "artistic trademark").
Such strange-making forces a "slowness of... perception" that "gives satisfaction." Id.
On a more general level, defamiliarization gives pleasure (and may produce anxiety)
because it makes the reader see anew something she thought she understood, and
suggests to her that it may actually mean something different than she assumed.
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upon which legal citation is based. And, if "[c] hanging what the sig-
nals mean effectively changes the substance of our common law," if
decisions and analyses are rendered based on the interpretation of
these signals, 53 then these signals are not only primary to legal citation,
but also to our system of law itself. Citational signals, then, are not
simply forms devoid of content, but constructions with import for, and
impact on, the development of legal scholarship. But legal citation is
alone in its insistence on this particular taxonomy, alone in the con-
viction that the writer must divulge the precise relevance of her
authority. None of the citation guides used extensively in the Hu-
manities, for example, includes a provision for distinguishing among
the weights of authorities cited. 4 And, the fact that each of the last
eleven editions of The Bluebook has incorporated changes to the intro-
ductory signals 5  emphasizes the taxonomy's vicissitude.
The taxonomy itself tells us that, in legal writing, not only sources
that directly state a proposition must be cited, but also sources that say
something related to the proposition. This "something" may be any-
thing from "clear[] support[]," as in the popular "see" citation, to
"analogous" support for the "cf." citation. Illustration and contradic-
tion of various levels are also to be noted. There is an intense concen-
tration on a notion of thoroughness (which includes the concept of
"balance") and, more importantly, on attribution. In an ideal citation,
fully utilizing the technology of rule 1.2, contradictory authority, indi-
rect authority, and, arguably, authority that has an even more distant
relationship to a proposition in the text would be found and cited.
And thus enters the string cite. "7
52 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 69.
53 See generally Robbins, supra note 16, at 1045 (noting that the definitions of sig-
nals "affect the analogical reasoning process that is at the foundation of common law
jurisprudence").
M There are three guides used extensively to govern citation practice in the Hu-
manities: THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE (14th rev. ed. 1993);JOSEPH GIBALDI, MLA
HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS OF RESEARCH PAPERS (5th ed. 1999); and JOSEPH GIBALDI,
MLA STYLE MANUAL AND GUIDE TO SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING (2d ed. 1998). The last
two are based on the same documentation style, but directed toward different audi-
ences: the Handbook to high school students and undergraduates, the Style Manual to
graduate students, scholars, and professional writers.
55 See Bast & Harrell, supra note 31, at 341 ("Each of the seventh through the six-
teen [sic] editions contained changes in the introductory signals."). For a discussion
of the changes reflected in the Seventeenth Edition, see supra note 35.
56 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(a), at 22-23.
57 A string cite that utilizes more than one signal is just one variety of this species.
For a discussion of the citation containing a number of sources within one signal, see
infra Part ll.D.
[Vol. 151: 245
THE ANXIETY OF A UTHORITY
It is not at all unusual to find a citation using more than one sig-
nal. Indeed, and unsurprisingly, the comment on the use of the "see
alsd' signal seems to require the use of multiple signals: "'See also' is
commonly used to cite an authority supporting a proposition when
authorities that state or directly support the proposition already have
been cited or discussed."'  Thus, a "see also" is most commonly used
after and in addition to a "[no signal]" and/or a "see." This signal
suggests that even an authority directly stating the proposition is not
quite enough authority, and seems to stand for the proposition that,
in the world of legal citation, more is better. "See also," then, putatively
opposes "e.g.," (or "see, e.g.,"), the more economical signal used when
"[c]ited authority states the proposition; other authorities also state
the proposition, but citation to them would not be helpful or is not
necessary., 59 Even so, footnotes often use each of these signals in tan-
dem. Professor Dickerson, "the recognized expert in legal citation,
60
footnotes a clause remarking that the Fifteenth Edition's rule-change
requiring the inclusion of an author's full name was "roundly criti-
cized, 61 with this string cite:
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1792-93 (calling the rule "a little too
rigid" and wondering: "[A] re we really supposed to provide a first name
and middle initial any time we cite a source, even if the author does not
provide that information?"); David E.B. Smith, Just When You Thought It
Was Safe to Go Back into the Bluebook: Notes on the Fifteenth Edition, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1991) (arguing that "[a]uthors should be able
to get proper credit for their efforts without having editors mangle theirf, 62
names" (footnotes omitted)); see also infra note 154.
Note 154, to which we are directed by the "see also" signal, reads:
See Gordon, supra note 99, at 1700 (calling the change an improvement
because "[t]here are more than forty law professors named Smith, and
58 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(a), at 23.
59 Id. at 22.
6o Weresh, supra note 4, at 787.
61 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 79.
62 Id. at 79 n.149 (alterations in original). This article appeared in 1996, after the
publication of the Sixteenth Edition, and is the only article in the issue that conformed
to its dictates. (Stetson Law Review had followed the suggestion of the January 4, 1997
Resolution Concerning Promulgation of Rules of Citation put forth by the AALS by
disregarding the signals-changes of the Sixteenth Edition.) It is important to note that
the changes to the rules for signals in the Sixteenth Edition have no bearing on this
discussion. Though the "sed' signal was modified to include authority that "directly
states" a proposition, this change is irrelevant here. The "e.g.," signal in the Sixteenth
Edition still indicated that citation to other authority was unnecessary, and the "see alsd'
signal included no changes.
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of course nonacademics also write articles. I have a suspicion that the
fourteen other law professors who share my surname have been really
ticked off at me until now." (footnotes omitted)); Posner, supra note 56,
at 1345 (urging that an author's full name be given-especially "in an
era of multiple Ackermans, Dworkins, Epsteins, Whites, [and]
Schwartzes"-"so that the reader will be in no doubt who the author is-
a bit of information that may tell him how much weight he wants to give
the citation and whether he wants to look it up"); Paulsen, supra note 1,
at 1792 (agreeing that "first names help"). But see Sirico, supra note 3, at
1276. Sirico remarked:
I do not understand why the reader needs this information in a cita-
tion. He or she can find it by checking the cited material. In those
occasional instances when the writer wants to insure that the reader
knows the cited author is a prominent individual-for example,
Harry W. Jones and not Buster Jones-the savvy writer can find a
way to convey this information.
Id. (footnote omitted).63
The citation, beginning with a "see, e.g.," signal referencing two
authorities, includes a "see alsd' referring to another note, which itself
includes a "see' and a "but see." Leaving aside the question, not rele-
vant to this discussion, of why support for the criticism of the rule
change should include, after a "see also," praise for the change, and
then, after a "but see," more criticism, the citations demonstrate the
conjunction of signals, even when one that has been used is supposed
to indicate that "citation to [other authorities] would not be helpful
or is not necessary. 6 4 The footnote does not seem to be following the
rule directly. However, it does cite six passages from five different
authorities. The fact that a "see, e.g.," introduces the footnote indi-
cates that something odd, something else, is going on.
The footnote has encountered some harsh criticism in the past
couple of decades,5 though the trend of excoriating it began much
earlier.66 Perhaps the most common observation about the law review
footnote is that it has proliferated and expanded beyond the bounds
of necessity or decency.67 One author suggests that this phenomenon
63 Id. at 79 n.154 (alterations in original).
64 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(a), at 22.
65 E.g., sources cited supra note 17.
W See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 289 (1962)
(referring to footnotes in law reviews as "phony excrescences").
67 See Austin, Product Differentiation, supra note 17, at 1133 ("[Law review] articles
are Typhoid Marys of an insidious plague-footnotes.... What started as incidental
and functional, footnoting is now thought to be a Frankenstein monster, rambling un-
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may stem from overzealous editing-a refusal on the part of editors to
believe that "there are some things of which we can sensibly just take
notice" without recourse to authority 6s-or from "the current trend
toward compulsory parentheticals: the appalling reduction of an en-
tire source into a phrase-a practice that burdens ... an already bot-
tom-heavy manuscript. Another plausible explanation arises in part
from the invitation of rules 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 to use multiple signals
and multiple sources within footnotes. Certainly, the source-heavy ci-
tation gives the impression of completeness. Stringing authorities to-
gether to support a single proposition, sentence, or phrase in an ar-
gument suggests careful and thorough research, and insinuates that
both the research and the citation are exhaustive. Moreover, the cita-
tion trailing off into a signal to indicate contradiction, such as "contra"
or "but see," implies balance and even-handedness, for the author has
even offered up authority that disagrees with her statement. This, in
turn, can give the appearance of strengthening the support for the
proposition, because the proffer of contrary authority hints that the
author's confidence in her argument can withstand such weakening
citation. Of course, another product of multiple-source citations is
the added force lent by the specific sources cited.
Arthur Austin has stated, in a pair of articles, that footnoting in
legal academia is largely self-serving, 0 and that "opportunistic writers
will exploit notes to cloak vacuous text."7' In an academic climate that
requires publication, and in which law reviews have proliferated,
"authors rely on 'footnote differentiation' as the primary vehicle to
distinguish their articles from those of their rivals., 71 If citation is a
technology that can set a writer apart from her colleagues, then there
are a number of tools that aid in this process. Austin believes that the
footnote, specifically the "Author's Note," is often used for networking
purposes: acknowledging the help of famous and/or respected
authorities gives the author credibility, the appearance of being "a
contributing member in a 'network' of successful academics," and a
controlled at the bottom of the page ...."); Sanger, supra note 17, at 521 (characteriz-
ing footnoting as a "growth industry").
68 Sanger, supra note 17, at 521.
69 Id. (footnote omitted).
70 See Austin, Skulduggry, supra note 17, at 1011 (stating that manipulation of foot-
notes can lead to promotion, tenure, and status); Austin,.Product Differentiation, supra
note 17, at 1135 (arguing that footnoting is a scholar's most effective way to differenti-
ate her work).
71 Austin, Skulduggey, supra note 17, at 1030.
72 Austin, Product Differentiation, supra note 17, at 1136.
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greater likelihood of being reciprocally cited. Benefits, however, do
not accrue only through acknowledgment in the personal Author's
Note, but even through citation in a conventional footnote.
Legal citation, like most other citation systems, privileges the
name of the author, which appears first in any citation of which it is a
part.14 But citation politics run in two directions simultaneously, bene-
fiting both the cited and the citer. The cited gains the all-important
citation, which is the "building block[] of academic stardom, and
those in the academic trenches understand this. For example, in an
article on "outsider scholarship," Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado
questioned a number of scholars (enumerated as "crits, radical femi-
nists, [and] critical race theorists")77 about, among other issues, cita-
tion. Of eleven questions, three focused on citation and the remain-
ing ones asked about publishing and job offers. 8  Thus, the
questionnaire placed the academic citation on a par with these other
components and indices of academic success. Of course, what the
cited gains is a free and effective advertisement.
The citer has something to gain, as well. Citing "newly discovered,
unusual, or exotic" sources,"' for example, can increase an author's
cachet. But citation to established authorities also adds something
(even more?) to an author's reputation-beyond the actual support
supplied by the authority, beyond the commonplace of giving the ap-
pearance of thoroughness, mentioned above. Attribution through ci-
tation
73 Id. at 1145-46; see also Austin, Skulduggery, supra note 17, at 1022-23 ("Author's
Notes may also facilitate 'conspiratorial cross-referencing' in which authors cite each
other as experts to enhance everyone's reputation." (footnote omitted)).
74 True, many legal texts are "unauthored" and thus cannot use the author's name
as an organizing principle. However, the default position for legal citation is that the
author's name, if available, precedes all other information about the cited text. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the Comment in which to deal with the phenomenon of legal "un-
authorship," which occurs with texts like statutes and judicial opinions.
7 For a fuller discussion of the citational politics discussed in the next few para-
graphs, see Michael Bacchus, Eating Eve's Plums: On Citation and Hero-Worship, in
QUEER FRONTIERS: MILLENNIAL GEOGRAPHIES, GENDERS, AND GENERATIONS 278 (Jo-
seph Boone et al. eds., 2000). The article deals with citation practice in the Humani-
ties, specifically in Queer Studies, but the underlying theory applies to legal citation.
71P Id. at 282.
7 Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Scholars: The Early Stories, 71 CHI.-
KENTL. REV. 1001, 1001 (1996).
78 Id. at 1002-07.
79 Austin, Product Differentiation, supra note 17, at 1147.
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corrals an author-complex for use in a paper, offering not only intertex-
tual, but also extratextual aid, which is to say that, just as any specific ci-
tation adds its layer to the overall image of the [cited], the image of the
[cited] ... becomes intertwined with the text in which it appears.
It matters what kind of authorities an author cites because those
authorities are lending more than bare support to the proposition(s)
for which they are cited. The "fugitive source" described above may
aid in presenting an author's work as current, cutting edge, or "hip."
On the other hand, utilizing the names of academic "stars" can "solid-
ify and further expand establishment image,' ', which is perhaps even
more valuable in a culture that is fundamentally conservative.8 '
Implicated in the citation to authority (i.e., "[a] source.., cited in
support of a legal argument") ,s then, is a concern about what consti-
tutes effective support-that is, what constitutes authority (i.e., "an ac-
cepted source of expert information") ,4 While this confusion must
reign in any academic discipline, it is exacerbated in legal academia
by the string cite and by the conventions of signaling that allow the
presentation of many different levels of relevancy to function as sup-
port. An author might be able to work in citations to many different
kinds of authorities in support of one proposition, covering the bases,
as it were, of direct, clear, and analogic support, as well as of prestige,
expertise, hipness, and amateurishness. Far from resolving the ques-
tion, however, such pilings further problematize these relationships,
paradoxically emphasizing the differences in weight and in authorial
signature by linking them together in one long citation sentence.
Look, for an example, to footnote eighty-two in this Comment, which
manages to mention six authors' names-two of them among the
80 Bacchus, supra note 75, at 286-87.
81 Austin, Product Differentiation, supra note 17, at 1146-47.
82 See Heifetz, supra note 3, at 695 ("[T]he essence of the legal culture in the
United States is a backward-looking, Burkean conservatism."); cf Bacchus, supra note
75, at 292 (noting that that which is authority is necessarily no longer oppositional or
cutting-edge, and thus that "authority" is always already a conservative construction);
Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 77, at 1011 (documenting the difficulties of non-
Establishment scholars in academic publishing and promotion, and publishing a letter
from Catherine MacKinnon to the authors stating that "[n]one of it is past, lost in the
bad old days"). The assertion that law faculties and academic legal departments are
fundamentally conservative may be a tautology. Law schools, after all, are primary sites
of teaching "the law," that most established of institutions. Additionally, and perhaps
consequently, such a statement may be one of those "things of which we can sensibly
just take notice." Sanger, supra note 17, at 521.
83 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (7th ed. 1999).
84 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTrIONARY 121 (4th ed. 2000).
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most famous professionals in legal academia, and one (unquestiona-
bly amateur) who has not been heard from until now. Richard Del-
gado's and Catherine MacKinnon's names, because of their fame,
would seem necessarily to add more ballast to an assertion, even if in-
troduced by a weaker signal, or simply included in a parenthetical.
The fact that they are preceded by my own name in the same "cf."
clause, and by the name of a practitioner from the U.S. Department of
Justice in an earlier (and stronger) clause creates an illusory hierarchy
of authority, in which Heifetz should provide the weightiest, and then
Bacchus, followed by Stefancic and Delgado, with MacKinnon adding
just a soupcon at the end. Such confusion, enabled by the conven-
tions of signaling, adds to and indexes the anxiety of authority (read:
the anxiety over the relationship between expertise and relevance in
authority) in the texts of legal academia.
C. Rule 1.3 and the Anxiety of the Relevance of Authority
We might, then, gloss this formulation of the anxiety of authority
as an anxiety over the prestige of the authority. Clearly, however, it is
affected by the interlocking hierarchies of the string cite, particularly
by the ordering of the weight of relevance, codified in rule 1.3, and
the discussion above implicitly recognizes the role played by the or-
dering of signals in this construction. But rule 1.3 also presents an-
other face of the anxiety of authority, betraying a clear anxiety about
relevance.
According to the rule, signals must be ordered with the weightiest
first. Thus, direct statement ("[no signal]," "e.g.,") precedes clear
support ("accord," "see"), which comes before additional support ("see
also") and analogous support ("cf."). There is an obvious presumption
in favor of direct statement or clear support, and this makes perfect
sense. Indeed, it seems that the definition of the fifth strongest sup-
porting signal, "see also," implies that a stronger signal has gone before
it. This requires, then, that all citations indicating support must begin
with, at least, the fourth strongest signal, "see," which indicates clear
support.8  Thus, The Bluebook actually mandates clear or direct sup-
port. This imperative leads "authors to characterize their strongest
authority as clear support," even if this is an overstatement of their
confidence in the authority.""
85 SeeRobbins, supra note 16, at 1073 (concluding that "[elvery writer's first source
must ... constitute clear support").
86 Id. at 1074.
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This anxiety about relevance affects other signals, as well. Inter-
preted as above, rule 1.3 urges that citations begin with the "strong"
signals (i.e., "[no signal]," "e.g.," "accord," "see"). One might argue that
a proposition supported by a single signal of less weight (i.e., "cf.")
does not have enough support to be convincing.8 7 And that suggests
that bare citational support is not appropriate, but instead that fuller• 88
discussion and explanation is required. What this argument recog-
nizes is that the rules of order create a situation in which certain sig-
nals that putatively indicate support can actually serve to deny support
to a proposition. A weak signal, such as "cf," calls attention to its
weakness because of the presumption in favor of stronger support.
An author's attitude toward an authority preceded by such a signal is
interpreted as ambivalent, or, at best, ambiguous. This particular
supporting signal seems to slide down page twenty-three of The Blue-
book, descending from a signal that indicates support to one that indi-
cates contradiction. 89
The "cf" citation, then, like the "see also" citation, might have its
primary utility as part of a larger citation sentence. And so, the two
signals would regularly be used only after signals indicating stronger
support. In such a situation, however, the anxiety of relevance still ob-
tains. Placed following stronger signals, these weaker ones still indi-
cate a lack of confidence in the authority's support, which inspires a
questioning of the relevance of the cited authority. As a citation sen-
tence tapers off, its utility becomes less and less apparent, and the thin
end seems a makeweight, generally unnecessary except, perhaps, for
ballast.
But what about balance? That is the apparent province of an even
more distant part of the citation, the signals indicating contradiction,
which are relegated to a separate citation sentence after signals indi-
,98cating support and the "[s]ignal that suggests a useful comparison. '
87 For a discussion ofjudicial opinions that make use of exactly that argument, see
id. at 1045, 1056-72.
88 The Bluebook does suggest that authority preceded by the "cf" signal include a
parenthetical explanation of its relevance. THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(a), at 23. Robbins
suggests that The Bluebook, instead, requires "relevant and substantive" parentheticals
after a "cf" signal, explicitly "promot[ing] this goal of reasoned elaboration." Robbins,
supra note 16, at 1076-77. The parenthetical would then become an argument in sup-
port of the proposition, which is supposedly supported by the authority.
89 Robbins even points to a case in which a "cf" signal is interpreted as negative
authority. See Robbins, supra note 16, at 1069 n.129 (citing Judge Easterbrook's con-
curring opinion in Czerkies v. United States Department of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996)).
90 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.2(b), at 23.
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The efficacy of including authority that contradicts a proposition in
the text, however, remains unclear.
Black's Law Dictionary construes "authority" as something that sup-
ports an assertion." The Bluebook, at first, seems to suggest likewise, stat-
ing in rule 1.1 that "[i]f a footnote itself contains an assertion requir-
ing support, a citation for the relevant authority should appear
directly after the assertion."9' The absence of any mention of contra-
diction implies that "citation for the relevant authority" is useful only
for support. Later in the rule, however, the parenthetical "(or con-
tradict)" is included after the word "support": "Authorities that sup-
port (or contradict) an entire sentence are given in a separate citation
sentence immediately after the sentence they support (or contra-
dict)," 93 for example. "Authority," then, expands to include that
which does not support. Importantly, however, it does not include
only that which directly contradicts, for among the three signals indi-
cating contradiction is the slippery "but cf," which is to be used when
"[c]ited authority supports a proposition analogous to the contrary of
the main proposition. 1 4 Authority introduced by a "but cf." has ex-
traordinarily attenuated relevance to the proposition asserted in the
text.
Note, too, that the rule has slipped back into the language of
"support." Each of the signals in rule 1.2(c) elides contradiction by
speaking of support. For "contra" the authority "directly states the
contrary of the proposition"; for "but see" it "clearly supports a proposi-
tion contrary to the main proposition."' 5 Interestingly, the "proposi-
tion" "support[ed]" by the "[c]ited authority" is not a proposition in-
cluded in the argument being made by the text. Rather, it is a
phantom proposition, the existence of which is suggested by the fact
of its opposite. The impetus to include authority indicating contradic-
tion may be to give the appearance of balance, to highlight the fact of
disagreement on an issue, or to indicate disapproval of a theoretical
or doctrinal stance, or of its proponent: 6 Whatever the motivation,
IM See supra text accompanying note 83 (defining "authority" as "[a] source...
cited in support of a legal argument" (alteration in original)).
92 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.1, at 21.
93 Id. R. 1.1(a)(i), at 21.
94 Id. R. 1.2(c), at 23.
95 Id.
96 None of these motives is clearly convincing. Citing contradictory authority to
provide balance can be a way simply to avoid significantly addressing opposing argu-
ments. After all, if the opposing arguments were addressed in the text, authorities
cited would use rule 1.2(a) signals indicating support. Balance, therefore, becomes
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however, the signals themselves masquerade as supporting, for they
are supporting something, even if it is something akin to the opposite
of the assertion the author is trying to prove. Thus, material that is
clearly substantively irrelevant to convincing a reader of the point an
author is trying to prove is cloaked in the language of relevance and
support. Perhaps here, near the terminus of the citation paragraph,
the place of dishonor, is the clearest evidence of the depth of the
anxiety of relevance in law review citation.
D. Rule 1.4 and the Anxiety of Authoritativeness
The most intricate and detailed of the interlocking hierarchies of
rule 1 is rule 1.4, governing the order of authorities within a signal
and covering three pages in The Bluebook. Commentators had com-
plained about this seemingly rigid hierarchy 7 and rule 1.4 is now
prefaced with a disclaimer of sorts: "If one authority is considerably
more helpful or authoritative than the other authorities cited within a
signal, it should precede the others. Absent this or some other sub-
stance-related rationale for placing one authority before another, cite
authorities in the order in which they are listed below."98 Clearly, the
rule is written according to the precept that more authoritative
sources should come before less authoritative ones, and so the "or-
der.., listed below" tracks a generally-held conception of the relative
authoritativeness of different generic sources.99
illusory. Alerting the reader to disagreement on an issue seems unnecessary, as a
proposition upon which there were no disagreement would be axiomatic, and would
require no authority at all. Including contradictory authority as a gesture of disap-
proval becomes a citation to authority that the author wants the reader to discount or
ignore. See, e.g., Grantmore, supra note 2, at 889 ("Once upon a time, truth was truth,
and we had a way to signal what wasn't."). Including such authority asks the reader to
pay no attention to that man behind the curtain. It is possible that the motivation is
more akin to that discussed in Part II.B, supra: to give the appearance of thorough-
ness, and to place an author as part of an intellectual circle.
97 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 8, at 1347 ("There is no need to have rules about the
order in which authorities are cited in a string citation. There is a natural order that
depends on the purpose of the string citation and the contents of the cited works."). I
say that the hierarchy is "seemingly" rigid because it has, actually, evolved. The Fif-
teenth Edition, for example, revised this order, mandating for the first time that con-
stitutions and statutes precede cases. Sirico, supra note 26, at 1277.
98 THE BLUEBOOK R. 1.4, at 25.
99 Note that the "considerably more helpful" and "substance-related" criteria are,
of course, context-driven, and could not be a basis for a generalized rule of order.
Note, too, that the prescribed ordering is not, however, devoid of meaning or contro-
versy. Sirico observes, for instance, that the decision to rearrange the hierarchy so that
constitutions and statutes precede cases "may reflect a judgment that we have moved
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As with the other rules discussed in this Comment, rule 1.4 clearly
contemplates that more than one source will be used to support a sin-
gle proposition. This rule even assumes that more than one source
will support a single proposition with the same weight of relevance,
for it mandates order within a signal. And, certainly, that is sometimes
true. Take, for instance, a citation from a Comment recently pub-
lished in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Asserting that
thirty-four states currently have "antidilution" laws, the footnote lists,
after a "see," all of the statutes in alphabetical order by state.' °° Such a
citation is clearly useful, informative, and even necessary according to
the prevailing conventions of legal citation.
In contrast to the "necessary" string cite is the "discretionary"
string cite-a citation that lists a number of sources to support one
proposition. The practice of stringing multiple signals together in this
sort of footnote has been discussed above in Part II.B, but such a
technique is also used with only one signal. The motivations may
largely be coterminous with those mentioned earlier. However, there
are some slight differences when the sources are being cited within
one signal, which means that each has the same weight of relevance.
After a "[no signal]"' 0 ' or a "see," a list of authorities must either "di-
rectly state[" or "clearly support[]" the proposition. Referring to
many sources in either of these cases would strengthen support by
showing that the proposition is widely held (or, even, widely held by a
number of influential people). But, as the number of sources cited
approaches infinity, the need for even a single source fades, because a
belief so solidly entrenched hardly requires authority to support it.
These citations, then, must tread carefully, balancing the interest of
collecting support that convinces with the danger of making that sup-
port seem unnecessary or indulgent. Moreover, one or perhaps two
from the era of the common law to the era of statutes." Sirico, supra note 26, at 1277.
Paulsen complains that the hierarchy, which relegates state courts to "second-class citi-
zenship," is a symptom of The Bluebook's "bad case of federal parochialism." Paulsen,
suPra note 7, at 1788.
100 Paul Edward Kim, Comment, Preventing Dilution of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act: Why the FTIDA Requires Actual Economic Harm, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 719, 726 n.35
(2001).
101 This rarely happens, at least at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
where "[no signal]" seems to be narrowly construed and used almost exclusively to
identify the source of a quotation or identify an authority mentioned in the text, nei-
ther of which would allow a list of sources. The case of an authority "directly stat[ing]
the proposition" is illustrated primarily by a source providing statistics, which are then
used in the text. Thus, this is the only case in which a "[no signal]" might contain
more than one authority.
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"authoritative" sources that directly state or clearly support a proposi-
tion would seem to obviate the need for more. Indeed, this kind of
citation overkill is almost certainly symptomatic of the anxiety of
authority, betraying an uncertainty about authority (e.g., how much to
cite, and to whom to cite) that paradoxically subtracts from the
proposition's support.
But the observation that a single "authoritative" source should
really suffice is meaningless if the concept of authoritativeness is un-
stable. Authoritativeness is supposed to be reflected in rule 1.4's hier-
archy. But, all hierarchies are ideological, and rule 1.4 is no different.
It may seem so obvious as to be unquestionable that a constitution is
more authoritative than a statute, which is more authoritative than
case law, because the constitution can trump the statute, which can
trump the case law, while the reverse is not generally true. But this
ignores the fact that the U.S. Constitution is interpreted in case law
(as are statutes), and it is more often U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that define rights and obligations than the rather vague and poetic
foundational document. The decision to assert the primacy of a con-
stitution over a case in the hierarchy, then, might reflect the notion
that we have moved from a common law era into a statutory one, 10 or
it might be a product of the need for the illusion of certainty in
American law and the comfort of the idea that law springs from a sin-
gle document and not from a tangle of opinions coming out of a war-
ren of courts.
This Comment, however, is more concerned with the work of le-
gal academics, both in citing and in being cited to, than the profes-
sional opinions of judges. Accordingly, I turn now to the section of
rule 1.4 that establishes the hierarchy of the work of legal academics:
rule 1.4(i), describing the order of "secondary materials." The rule
moves through nine categories, from model codes and restatements
all the way down to electronic sources (presumably those that are not
S 103
available in print) . Of particular interest are categories two through
five:
102 See supra note 99 (discussing Sirico's opinion that "'we have moved from the
era of the common law to the era of statutes"').
103 See THE BLUEBOOK R. 18, at 129 ("[T]raditional printed sources" should be
used and cited, "except when the information is not available in a printed source, or if
the traditional source is obscure or hard to find .... In the latter case ... the tradi-
tional source should be used and cited, and the electronic source may be given as a
parallel citation .... ).
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(2) books, pamphlets, and shorter works in a collection of a single
author's works (alphabetically by last name of author; if none, by
first word of title)
(3) works in journals (not magazines or newspapers), including forth-
coming works and shorter works in a collection of various authors'
works (alphabetically by last name of author)
(4) book reviews not written by students (alphabetically by last name of
reviewer)
(5) student-written law review materials including book reviews (alpha-
betically by last name of author; if none, by first word of title; if
none, by periodical as abbreviated in citation).
Pride of place is given to the author of a book, pamphlet, or collec-
tion, and single-authorship of an entire publication seems to be the
distinguishing characteristic. As well as preceding other "authored"
secondary materials,05 these sources are differentiated in footnotes by
typeface conventions, for both the author's name and the title of the
publication appear in large and small capital letters. 06 The remaining
sources listed in this rule do not get the distinction of that typeface,
but are cited with the author's name in ordinary roman type and the
work's title in italics.0 Thus, the rule privileges as authoritative the
singly-authored, self-contained work, suggesting, somewhat problem-
atically, that a work that stands alone has a greater claim to expertise
than a work that is included in a collection by various authors.""
Expertise is again at issue in the next category, that of the aca-
demic journal, which excludes from its parameters work that appears
in magazines or newspapers, presumably generally written by journal-
104 Id. R. 1.4(i), at 27.
105 Model codes and restatements, which precede even singly-authored publica-
tions, are "unauthored" works, that is, works without an authorial signature.
106 THE BLUEBOOK R. 2.1 (b), at 31; see also id. R. 15.5.1 (b), at 112 (mandating the
use of large and small capitals for the author's name and the title of the volume for
shorter works in a collection by a single author, while requiring the use of italics for
the title of the shorter piece).
17 See, e.g., id. R. 16.6, at 121-23 (describing the proper typeface for non-student-
written book reviews, student-written law review materials, and student-written book
reviews).
108 While it could be hypothesized that the, rule implies that singly-authored longer
works have the authoritative upper hand, the inclusion of the pamphlet makes it clear
that self-containment is the operative consideration. But cf FOUCAULT, supra note 45,
at xix-xx ("On what 'table', according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies,
have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? ...
[T] here is no similitude and no distinction ... that is not the result of a precise opera-
tion and of the application of a preliminary criterion.").
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ists and lay people and not by experts in the substantive field of the
article. The academic journal is set apart from other periodicals (an
interesting separation in this discipline, given the way that law reviews
are edited),"" and, importantly, professional academic authorship is
set apart from amateur authorship. Relegated to category five are all
"student-written law review materials," which are superseded even by
book reviews, as long as they are not written by students. There is
some inconsistency here, as law reviews are journals, and category
three purports to govern works in journals and does not make an ex-
ception for student-written work. It is unclear, too, where a book re-
view written by a student (as many are) in a journal that is not a law
review would appear: as a book review, it should be a part of category
four, except that it is student-authored; as student-written material, it
might be category five, except that it is not law review material; so
perhaps it belongs in category three, as a work appearing in ajournal
that is neither a book review not written by a student nor student-
written law review material.
But the point here is not to bemoan the ambiguity of one of The
Bluebook's rules-that has been left to greater minds than mine." In-
stead, I see the attempt at exactness in this rule as an index of the
anxiety of authoritativeness in legal citation. After all, where the rule
runs into trouble is in its effort to cordon off student-written material
from non-student-written material, that is, from material written by
professionals (or, better, by professors?). What is the difference be-
tween students who write in academic journals, including law reviews,
and professionals who do?
Focusing on legal journals, and assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, that most of those who are published in legal journals are law
professors or law students, a number of possibilities come to mind. At
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the law faculty is over-
whelmingly white and male. The student body is substantially more
diverse. So, perhaps the difference between the two groups is gender,
race, and ethnicity. Thus, the privileging of the professionally-written
material over the student-written material trickles down to become a
privileging of white male authority. This is an interesting hypothesis,
but, while it might obtain at Penn Law, it may not be the case at other
109 See infra Part III ("[A] cademic legal journals are not peer-refereed, but, rather,
are edited by students.").
110 See, e.g., supra notes 7-15 (citing literature by Rees, Dickerson, Paulsen, Posner,
Slomanson, Weresh, Jacobson, and Chen). Of course, I am using a notion of "great-
ness" that seems to be endorsed by rule 1.4(i).
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law schools."' More likely, the distinction reflects a decision that the
professional has a greater claim to authority than does the amateur.
But, again, the rule itself serves to undermine this decision. In
separating the two kinds of authors, the rule seeks to ensure that their
authority will not be confused. The student author should always ap-
pear after (i.e., in a position inferior to that of) the professional aca-
demic author."2  But, in its enthusiasm to ghettoize the student
author, the rule recognizes the clear possibility that she truly might be
confused with her professor, that her work actually might evince the
attributes necessary to represent and constitute authoritativeness. If
the student's work is "considerably more helpful or authoritative"
than her professor's, then the rule allows it to be cited first. However,
in the absence of such a context-based reason, if all else is equal, the
default position is that the student's work follows her professor's.
That is, professional status stands as a proxy for authoritativeness, and
the professional author takes precedence over the student (writing as
a student). And, here I use the term "professional" in two ways, simul-
taneously, designating both an author who is engaged in a "profes-
sion," such as the legal profession, and a person who works primarily
as an author. Rule 1.4(i) tells us that both kinds of authors, whether
academic or "creative," are likely to occupy the place of authoritative-
ness in a one-signal string citation. Rule 15.5.1(b) emphasizes this by
illustrating the citation form for shorter works in a collection by a sin-
gle author (category two of rule 1.4(i)) with a sample citation to Adri-
enne Rich's Transcendental Etude, included in her volume of poetry,
The Fact of a Doorframe.13 Thus, the primary focus is on the author, as
opposed to her work, and the primary way for sifting through authors
is by focusing on their professional status. Conventions of legal cita-
tion seem to allow the use of this technique to avoid actual evaluation
of authoritativeness, perhaps because it is not clear how legal acade-
IH See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1994) ("Our research is only about the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School and may not apply to other institutions of legal educa-
tion which do not share Penn's history, dominant first year pedagogy, and predomi-
nantly male faculty.").
There are imaginable cases in which the hierarchy would require citation of
student-written material before, say, the work of a tenured law professor: for example,
when an established authority writes a newspaper or magazine article. In this case, the
academic author has become an article writer and will be cited below even student-
written lawjournal material. Rule 1.4's "escape clause" could "correct" that order.
113 THE BLUEBOOK R. 15.5.1 (b), at 112.
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mia should determine authoritativeness and negotiate the divide be-
tween expert and amateur.
III. "AMATEURITY" AND AUTHORITY
In legal academia, the relationship between the amateur and the
professional is unusually troubled. Though this may be due in part to
idiosyncrasies of American law school classroom pedagogy (as op-
posed to that of other types of American graduate schools), it likely
has more to do with the power that amateurs (i.e., law students) have
vis-A-vis professionals (i.e., law professors) outside of the classroom.
This power derives from the governance of the primary organs of legal
scholarship in America-academic legal journals.
In contrast to the academicjournals of other disciplines, academic
legal journals are not peer-refereed, but, rather, are edited by stu-
dents. Law students serving as editorial board members have the re-
sponsibility not only of editing articles accepted for publication, but
also of actually doing the selecting. In other respects, however, legal
academic publishing resembles the academic publishing of other dis-
ciplines. That is to say that the pressure on faculty to publish is just as
great in legal academia as it is elsewhere in academia. 14 Decisions
made by law students, then, have a considerable effect on the careers
of law professors. In some ways, amateurs function as the gatekeepers
to professional advancement-a delicious irony given the strictures of
rule 1.4(i).
As a result, academic professionals have taken to commenting on
the role of students in academic legal publishing, stressing the ama-
teur status of law review editors, that is, stressing the putative differ-
ence, discussed above, between amateur and professional."' Even so,
114 See Austin, Skulduggery, supra note 17, at 1015 ("Competition exploded on the
supply side when pre-tenure faculty were forced to 'publish or perish."'); Sanger, supra
note 17, at 516 ("The work of junior colleagues is regularly reviewed as part of stan-
dard time grade requirements. Most of us agree that scholarship sensibly contributes
to decisions about tenure, promotion, and hiring."); Elyce H. Zenoff & Lizabeth A.
Moody, Law Faculty Attrition: Are We Doing Something Wrong?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUc. 209,
220 (1986) (noting that publication of legal scholarship is a primary criterion for ten-
ure).
115 Professor Sanger writes:
Let us start with the editors themselves. They are often young, a good rec-
ommendation for many activities, though not necessarily editing. They are
also students, which means in most cases that they are not as familiar (or not
at all familiar) with the substantive issues of a particular paper .... Few are
trained as editors or plan to make a career out of it. Most student editors have
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the predominance of student-edited law journals in the United States
means that amateurs regularly make decisions about the professional
work of professionals. Professionals, in turn, look to the-decisions of
these amateurs in determining the professional development of their
colleagues. " In this milieu, the amateur has an extraordinary and
unusual claim to authority and, indeed, authoritativeness.
Many who begrudge the implications and consequences of the
student-run law review, however, concede that there is a text on which
the law student is an expert: The Bluebook. Citation format can be a
source of argument between authors and editors, but these are argu-
ments in which the editor is likely to prevail, given her "superior grasp
of Bluebook arcana."117 This expertise is bred of familiarity. Law jour-
nal editors are saddled with poring over a manual of citation-The
Bluebook-as part of their regular duties. Interestingly, however, some
of these same editors are also responsible for editing this manual of
citation and have been subject to charges of ineptitude or amateu-
rity."s A repeated complaint about The Bluebook seems to be that the
likely had no editorial experience before sitting down to your paper other
than having had their own work hacked to bits by students who experienced
the same thing the year before.
Sanger, supra note 17, at 517; see also Austin, Skulduggery, supra note 17, at 1014 (men-
tioning that "[1]awjournal editors... [are] disdained as students and chastised for
their 'neophytic judgment,"' and noting that they "lack[] the experience of profes-
sionals" (footnote omitted)).
Another commentator, identified in the Author's Note as an executive editor of
the Harvard Law Review from 1990 to 1991, asserts (albeit facetiously) that the relation-
ship between law review editors and authors is even more tense, stating, "Editors and
professors distrust each other with an intensity that dwarves the animosity displayed in
some marriages, most divorces, and all prenuptial contracts." Chen, supra note 13, at
1534.
11 It has even been suggested that students "write" articles attributed to profes-
sionals. Sanger cites a false story "reporting... that the tenure piece of a junior pro-
fessor had been ghostwritten by student editors," Sanger, supra note 17, at 514 n.6, and
later complains that "articles are too frequently transformed from something written
by an author with a distinct voice, point of view, and line of argument to something
closer to a composition by student committee," id. at 517.
117 Chen, supra note 13, at 1535; cf Grantmore, supra note 2, at 890 ("Student-
edited law reviews rely heavily on tests of Bluebook skills in selecting new staff mem-
bers .... ).
118 See Pamela Lysaght & Grace Tonner, Plain Language: Bye-Bye Bluebook?, 79
MICH. B.J. 1058, 1058 (2000) ("[I]nstead of striving for consistency and stability when
adding citation formats for new sources, successive editorial boards [of The Bluebook]
seemingly sought to put their imprint on new editions and made pointless, frivolous
changes .... ); Weresh, supra note 4, at 784 ("[T]he release of the Sixteenth Edition
has revealed weaknesses in a process that leaves this significant subject within the uni-
lateral control of law students .... (citation omitted)); cf Posner, supra note 8, at
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law reviews that are in charge of its editing cannot follow its format."9
Stewardship and editorship of The Bluebook, then, do not confer
authority, though study might. The ALWD Citation Manual makes
abundantly clear that the struggle over citation form is a struggle be-
tween amateurs and professionals. The President of the ALWD who
presided over the beginning stages of the new manual hankered for a
guide "prepared by professional legal writing teachers and librarians,
in a joint effort-not a student-written and poorly organized Blue-
book."1 20 The editors consequently chose to subtitle the manual "A Pro-
fessional System of Citation.' 21
IV. ANXIETY AND (IN) STABILITY
In legal academia and publishing, the bases of and relationships
between the amateur and the expert, the "neophyte" and the profes-
sional, are notably unstable. And it makes some sense that the con-
cept of authority would become a focus in a discipline in which these
constructions are fissured, if not fractured. Current citation form, as
embodied in The Bluebook, and current citation practice, as demon-
strated in law journals across the country, seem a symptom of this
concern, here pathologized as anxiety. The Bluebook begins the discus-
sion about citation form, in its rule 1, with the extraordinarily intricate
and interestingly idiosyncratic mechanism for determining authority,
relevance, and authoritativeness. And so, this Comment has exca-
vated some support for believing that this structure is founded on an
anxiety of authority. And it is possible, perhaps likely, that an intricate
and complex system of determining and weighing textual (and extra-
textual) authority is a necessary by-product of an American legal sys-
tem that is plagued by concerns about authority, in the many senses of
the word.
This is, as patriots are fond of saying, a nation of laws, one that re-
spects the "rule of law." Thus, legal texts are the ultimate authority.
1343 (praising the students at The University of Chicago Law School for challenging
The Bluebook).
,19 See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 4, at 88-89 ("[E]ven the four schools that pro-
duce the Bluebook [sic] do not always agree on style and do not always follow its rules.").
120 Jan M. Levine, ALWD Biennial Conference Plenary Address 2 (July 1997) (on
file with author).
121 ALWD MANUAL, supra note 28 (emphasis added). Moreover, Professor Dicker-
son, the lead author of the ALWD Citation Manual, is an expert on citation not through
editorship of The Bluebook (she attended Vanderbilt University School of Law), but ap-
parently through professional study (as Director of Research and Writing at Stetson
University College of Law). Dickerson, supra note 4, at 53 n.aa.
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Their status as primary might well lend itself to a generalized anxiety
about the authoritative texts themselves. But we have seen more than
simply a generalized anxiety; we have seen specific anxieties about
when to cite (virtually always), how much to cite (more), and whom to
cite (the expert). These various anxieties of authority all serve to en-
sure that propositions in legal texts are backed up by authority suffi-
cient to make them unremarkable. Each step in an argument, except,
perhaps, the ultimate, is well-grounded in what has come before, and
the contribution of that ultimate step can therefore be seen as an in-
cremental one. Thus, conventions of legal citation contour legal aca-
demics to the processes of the common law-the slow, deliberate de-
velopment of legal doctrine through the accretion of precedent. The
conventions of citation embodied in The Bluebook are not, then,
anomalies. Rather, their resolute caution might well be a function of
a legal system that is fundamentally conservative, requiring that the
legal actor is always aware of the influence of her powerful predeces-
sors. From this perspective, the anxiety of authority in legal analysis is
an outgrowth of the anxiety of influence, molded by the shape of legal
culture. The anxiety created by the influence of predecessors obtains
here, as elsewhere. It is the response to that anxiety that differs, for
where the poet must disavow such influence, the legal writer must
embrace it.
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